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As Jonathan Swift made mockingly clear, “modest pro-
posals” that purport to solve previously unyielding problems
can have horrible implications. Such proposals should be sub-
jected to skeptical analysis. So we are pleased that our pro-
posed random method of case selection for the qualitative com-
ponent of multi-method research has attracted some skeptical
commentary in the research community in political science.1
And we are very grateful to David Freedman for providing a
perspective on our approach. He is especially qualified to do
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results. Such a perspective would undervalue contributions
made by small-N methods. More generally, that kind of per-
spective ignores a crucial point: there are many ways to do
good science.
Notes
1 Fearon and Laitin show that close examination of typical cases
(countries with no civil war and low probability of civil war accord-
ing to the model) can be illuminating—a special and valuable feature
of their research. Indeed, they use the cases to check the qualitative
implications of their causal model.
2 Seawright and Gerring (2008) give a clearer account of the mat-
ter, indicating that the relevant population must be large.
3 The setting for propensity-score matching is usually an obser-
vational study where subjects self-select into one of two condi-
tions; call these “treatment” and “control.” The first step is usually
to estimate the conditional probability that a subject winds up in
treatment, given the covariates. Logit models are often used. This is
not an activity to be undertaken with a small sample. For empirical
evidence on the weaknesses of matching designs in large-N research,
see for instance Arcenaux, Gerber, and Green (2006), Glazerman,
Levy, and Myers (2003), Peikes, Moreno, and Orzol (2008), Wilde
and Hollister (2007). For additional discussion pro and con, see
Review of Economics and Statistics 86:1 (February 2004); Journal
of Econometrics 125:1–2 (March-April 2005).
4 Suppose, for instance, that we have an experimental population
of 1,000 subjects, with 400 chosen at random and assigned to treat-
ment; the remaining 600 are the controls. Each subject has two
potential responses: one is observed if the subject is assigned to
treatment, and the other if assigned to control. The average response
of the 400 is an unbiased estimate of what the average would be if all
1,000 subjects were assigned to treatment. Likewise, the average
response of the 600 is an unbiased estimate of the average response
if all 1,000 subjects were controls. The general principle is this: with
a simple random sample, the sample average is an unbiased estimate
of the population average. For additional details, see Freedman (2006).
5 For example, see Freedman, Pisani, and Purves (2007). Chapter
27 discusses experimental comparisons; technical detail is provided
in A31–36. Chapter 29 explains what happens without randomiza-
tion; also see Freedman (2008e).
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7so, as he is a leading statistician who has long worried about
inflated claims for statistical methods in the social sciences,
and has been a champion of approaches that are sensi-
tive to the particularities of each datapoint.
We completely agree with Freedman’s claim that there are
many ways to do good social science. Indeed, as Freedman
quotes us, we argued that the random narratives approach is
“a compelling complement” to large-N research. This is more
modest than Freedman’s implication that we believe we have
discovered the one true path for multi-method research. In
fact, if everyone did random narratives, there would be no
expert narratives for the research community to consult!
Furthermore, as Freedman points out, the method has
been applied only to our work on civil war onsets. Perhaps it
will not be the best approach for other questions that schol-
ars want to use multiple methods to address. We agree, al-
though one goal of our article was to argue that there are
good a priori (or theoretical) reasons to think that the ap-
proach could be valuable for research designs on topics other
than civil war onset. Multi-method and other social science
research inevitably involves a process of going back and forth
between theory and data (despite the pristine hypothesis-
testing scenario assumed in statistics textbooks). The ran-
dom narratives approach is a way to discipline and make more
productive this back-and-forth process in a fairly typical so-
cial science setting, where one has cross-sectional or panel
data with which to document empirical patterns, and histori-
cal materials available to investigate causal mechanisms in
particular cases.
In the case of our work on civil war, we constructed a
country/year dataset with civil war onset as the dependent
variable.2 We estimated a statistical model that identified sev-
eral correlates of civil war onsets for which we proposed pos-
sible causal interpretations. The interpretations were based
on a reading of the statistical results and our previous knowl-
edge of a set of cases well known to us. To look at those same
cases for qualitative support for a causal interpretation would
have been intellectual double-dipping. The method of ran-
domly selecting cases for analysis of causal mechanisms be-
hind peace or war onset helped us to avoid or at least reduce
this bias. But we certainly do not maintain that random selec-
tion of cases for detailed analysis would always be the most
effective and efficient approach in a multi-method research
project, independent of the subject matter or the stage of the
research (in terms of “back and forth”).
Freedman writes that our “claimed superiority of large-N
methods is obviously right if ‘empirical regularities’ are statis-
tical measures of association, like regression coefficients. The
thesis is less obvious if ‘empirical regularities’ are defined
more broadly, so as to include (for example) causal relation-
ships.” We agree here as well, although we were trying in the
cited sentences precisely to distinguish empirical regularities
in the sense of mere associations from causal relationships.
We would not claim a generalized superiority of large-N meth-
ods for identifying causal relationships. Indeed, the main idea
of the multi-method approach we are endorsing is to use case-
specific evidence systematically to assess whether causal in-
terpretations of the mere associations seen in a regression
analysis are justified.
We do not therefore see how Freedman attributes to us
the notions of the “superiority” of large-N methods or that
“qualitative methods are useful only as checks on quantita-
tive results.” These claims may suggest incorrectly that we
think causal relationships are easily read out of large-N sta-
tistical studies in social science. They also misread our view
of the contributions made by small-N methods in the overall
research process. In practice, as we noted above, there is a
constant back-and-forth between data and theory in social
science research, with case study evidence entering in more
than one way. Knowledge of particular cases often helps to
suggest causal mechanisms that may or may not be common
and relevant in a larger sample of cases, and so may motivate
and guide construction of a large-N study. A large-N study
may in turn reveal new and different-from-expected patterns
that stimulate new (or revised) theorizing about causal rela-
tionships, which may then be assessed by a return to case
studies (chosen at random?). Those case studies may sug-
gest new causal relationships that can subsequently be put
to test with a newly constructed dataset. So it often happens
in political science that case studies come into the scientific
process at an early stage, motivating the research and the
source of early conjectures, and then again at a later stage,
after the regressions have been run.
Researchers in comparative politics invariably go back-
and-forth between theory and data, and quite often they go
back and forth between cases and broad patterns. Our mod-
est proposal is an attempt to make progress on the question
of by what principles to choose the cases in the context of the
back and forth.
Notes
1 See for example Evan Lieberman’s critique of our proposed
method, “Nested Analysis as a Mixed-Method Strategy for Com-
parative Research.” American Political Science Review 99:3 (August
2005), 435–52.
2 James D. Fearon and David D. Laitin, “Ethnicity, Insurgency,
and Civil War.” American Political Science Review 97:1 (February
2003), 75–90.
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Recognition of the problem posed by case selection in
case study research stretches back, arguably, to the very be-
ginnings of the genre, e.g., to early work by Frederic Le Play
(1806–1882) and Florian Znaniecki (1882–1958). Harry Eck-
stein’s (1975) classic study, a point of departure for political
scientists today, appeared over three decades ago. Clearly, the
field has been struggling with this issue for some time.1
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